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Several European states have pursued austerity policies in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but how
have these policies affected welfare states? Sotirios Zartaloudis writes on the impact of the crisis
in Greece and Portugal. He argues that both countries have had to pursue unprecedented
spending cuts, tax rises and labour market reforms and that the crisis has had a significant negative
effect on their welfare states.
The on-going financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crises in Greece and Portugal have
ensured these countries have faced spiralling borrowing costs. These ever-increasing borrowing
costs and recourse to the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for
financial support meant that they had to implement extensive fiscal consolidation measures to tackle their
unsustainable borrowing levels. In a recently published article, I present the findings of a research project assessing
the impact of the economic crisis on Greek and Portuguese welfare states which caused ‘shock and awe’ in both
countries.
Fiscal consolidation in Greece and Portugal
After the crisis, both countries implemented an unprecedented wave of cuts, tax rises and labour market reforms.
More specifically, public sector pay and jobs were cut, pensions were significantly curtailed and pension rights
substantially restricted. For instance, in both countries the retirement age was increased, a threshold for pensions
was introduced and pensioners lost a considerable part of their pension by the abolition of the Christmas, Easter
and summer bonus. The latter measure was also applied in all public sector workers, while Portugal went a step
further and introduced a special levy to all self-employed people to the same effect.
In addition, successive tax hikes were implemented –
mainly increases of indirect taxes like VAT – along with
increases in property taxes. Welfare benefits became
less generous and more conditional, with less
protection for the unemployed and considerable cuts in
healthcare budgets. Both countries reduced public
investment in order to achieve savings in their spending,
resulting in the abandonment of a number of public work
projects. In order to cut spending and increase
revenues, both countries implemented wide-ranging
privatisation of state corporations and/or ports.
Due to the limited interest of western investors, Greece
and Portugal also completed a number of privatisation
processes with investors from developing countries (in
the case of Portugal it was mostly Angolan investors
who showed interest while in Greece it was mainly
China). Moreover, there was a push towards labour
market flexibility with less protection for workers and lower minimum wages in order to regain competitiveness. At
the same time, both countries are also plagued with high unemployment, recession and low growth. The
combination of cuts, tax increases and low growth has led to a very harsh economic environment plagued with
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insecurity and decreasing living standards.
Consequences for the Greek and Portuguese welfare states
These cuts have resulted in considerable welfare retrenchment. Ironically, for both countries EU and euro
membership were two celebrated achievements that were associated with an improvement in living and social
standards and a process of Europeanisation of their welfare states, whereby the Greek and Portuguese people
would enjoy similar social rights to the citizens of richer EU countries. Alas, both achievements are increasingly
becoming synonymous with austerity – something unprecedented for both countries.
Indeed, besides the stabilisation of their political systems, for both countries EU entry meant a path towards
catching up with their developed EU partners of the core. Although Europe has always been used by domestic
actors for upgrading national welfare states, this process remained incomplete and somewhat uneven. In other
words, despite considerable improvements in their welfare states, both Greece and Portugal caught up only partially
with and with much less generous provisions than most EU-15 countries. Hence, recent EU discourses blaming
profligate southerners who have been living beyond their means is only partially supported by empirical reality.
The integration of Europe’s Southern Periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – known as the Cohesion
Countries or by the offensive acronym PIGS) into the EU has always been a controversial issue: on the one hand,
some have highlighted the acute disparities between Europe’s periphery and core. On the other, the literature
emphasised the crucial link between EU membership and political, economic and social modernisation. However,
both Greece and Portugal appear to have been significantly more vulnerable to the crisis than the richer countries of
Northern Europe (e.g. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands) and their larger Southern
counterparts (Italy and Spain). Yet, the latter had to implement similar measures, albeit in a less abrupt and
extensive fashion. In other words, it may be argued that it is not size but whether a country is part of the EU core or
of the EU periphery in terms of economic and political power that matters for coping with the effects of the current
crisis.
The fact that three out of four Cohesion countries have been ousted from financial markets and have required
EU/IMF support raises complicated and unsettling questions about the ability of the EU to achieve convergence
between rich and poor countries and renders its future direction uncertain. Additionally, it demonstrates the multi-
faceted failure of markets, national governments, and EU institutions to anticipate and deal with the crisis. It remains
to be seen whether the (painful and unpopular) reforms implemented thus far will help overcome the crisis or
whether Europe’s southern periphery will face more hardship in future.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/ZbwPy8
 _________________________________
About the author
Sotirios Zartaloudis –Loughborough University
Dr Sotirios Zartaloudis, is Lecturer in Politics at Politics, History and International Relations at
Loughborough University. His research interests include Europeanization, public policy, welfare
reforms, and the impact of the financial crisis on national social policy and politics. His monograph
on the impact of the European Employment Strategy on Greek and Portuguese employment policies
was published this summer.
2/3
3/3
